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5.1  Introduction 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 established an alternative minimum tax (AMT) 
for corporations, designed with the intention of preventing corporations from 
paying low rates of tax on their economic income. Under the rules of the AMT, 
corporations now calculate their tax payments twice: once using the regular 
rules of  the tax system and a second time using the alternative computation 
provided under the AMT. Firms pay tax based on the calculation resulting in 
the greatest liability. 
The AMT affects a significant number of firms. In 1990, the corporate AMT 
accounted 'for 8.5 percent of corporate tax receipts, or $8.1 billion. Including 
regular taxes paid by these AMT firms, AMT firms paid 21.4 percent of all 
corporate income tax.  Approximately 25 percent of corporations with assets in 
excess of $50 million paid AMT. Among the largest firms, those with assets in 
excess of $500 million, the proportion of firms paying AMT was 30.6 percent. 
Among multinational firms, AMT incidence is slightly more prevalent. This 
is partly due to the correlation between firm size and AMT liability and the 
fact that the largest firms are also more likely to receive foreign-source income. 
Among firms in 1990 filing form 1118-the  form on which foreign tax credits 
are calculated-28  percent of those with assets in excess of  $50 million paid 
AMT. Among these multinationals with assets in excess of $500 million, 33.3 
percent paid AMT.  Of  all form 1118 filers, 53 percent of  all assets and 56 
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percent of all foreign-source income were accounted for by corporations pay- 
ing AMT. 
Not much is known about how firms are affected by the AMT. Limited past 
analyses have focused primarily on the incentives domestic firms face for un- 
dertaking new investment.’ But the effects of the AMT rules on multinationals 
are potentially quite different. Multinationals may be affected in a number of 
different ways, from the design of dividend repatriation strategies to the loca- 
tional choice for real investment. This paper outlines how multinational corpo- 
rations’ incentives can be affected by  the AMT and presents data suggestive 
of how important these effects may be. 
5.2  AMT Provisions Affecting Multinationals 
The AMT rules potentially affect multinational corporations (MNCs) in a 
manner quite different from their effect on domestic corporations. First, the 
taxable income of domestic corporations (and that of the domestic operations 
of MNCs) is generally increased due to restrictions on deductions under the 
AMT and the inclusion of certain income that would be excluded from taxation 
under the regular tax. For foreign operations, however, deductions are quite 
similar for AMT and regular tax purposes. 
Second, although the domestic tax base is generally larger under the AMT 
than under the regular tax, the tax rate on all AMT income is 20 percent rather 
than the 35 percent rate that generally applies to corporations under the regular 
tax system. As a result, whether a firm pays tax under the AMT depends on 
the particular sources of income and types of deductions received by the firm. 
For U.S.-based MNCs, the lower marginal rate of taxation under the AMT may 
provide the firm a timing opportunity to repatriate income from low-tax foreign 
countries. Repatriated income is less likely to be subject to U.S. tax, or is 
subject to a smaller amount of tax, because foreign tax credits can shelter a 
greater percentage of taxable income. 
Third, a separate AMT provision limits the total amount of tax that may be 
offset through foreign tax credits. For a firm for which this provision is a bind- 
ing constraint, positive amounts of  U.S. tax will be paid on repatriated divi- 
dends even if the firm would otherwise have excess foreign tax credits. 
The starting point for determining whether a firm owes AMT is the firms’ 
regular taxable income before any deduction for net operating losses. To this 
amount, the firm adds back a number of  deductions that are restricted under 
the AMT and certain sources of income not taxable under the regular tax rules 
(adjustments and preferences). Adjustments include a cutback on depreciation 
allowances allowed for domestic property and a reduction in the preferential 
treatment of certain assets (such as pollution-control facilities) or benefits for 
certain industries (such as oil and gas production). 
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If the firm has deductions for net operating losses, these may offset no more 
than 90 percent of  this computed income (whereas these losses may  offset 
100 percent of regular income). The resulting income measure is defined as 
alternative minimum taxable income, which may be reduced by  a limited ex- 
emption amount. 
Tax is calculated by multiplying this net amount by the 20 percent AMT tax 
rate. Business credits, such as the R&D tax credit, may not be used against the 
AMT. Tax  may  be reduced, however, by  a limited amount of  AMT foreign 
tax credits, as described in more detail below. This yields the firm’s tentative 
minimum tax. Tentative minimum tax is compared to regular income tax be- 
fore all credits except the foreign tax credit and the possessions tax credit. 
If tentative minimum tax exceeds this amount of regular tax liability, the ex- 
cess is payable as AMT, in addition to the firm’s payment of  its regular tax 
liability. Each dollar of AMT payments creates a dollar of AMT credits that 
may be used in future years only against regular income tax liability. AMT 
credits may not be used to reduce regular tax liability below tentative mini- 
mum tax. 
5.3  Investment Incentives of Multinational Corporations 
For domestic property, the AMT generally creates a tax penalty for new 
investment undertaken by  an AMT firm, relative to the incentives faced by a 
regular-tax firm.*  While income earned under the AMT is taxed at 20 percent, 
compared to the 35 percent rate of the regular tax system, a firm claims less 
accelerated depreciation allowances on its domestic investment than for regu- 
lar tax purposes. In practice, the slower stream of depreciation allowances re- 
duces investment incentives by more than the lower tax rate increases them. 
For foreign-use property, however, a firm claims the same depreciation deduc- 
tions on the AMT as it would for regular tax purposes. If the income generated 
by  the foreign investment is taxed currently by  the United States, it will be 
taxed at a maximum rate of  20 percent under the AMT rather than the 35 
percent tax rate applying under the regular tax system. As a result, foreign 
investment incentives appear to be no worse off under the AMT than under the 
regular tax rules and may, in fact, be improved when the income is currently 
taxed in the United States. 
Calculations for representative categories of equipment confirm this result. 
For  example, for equity-financed investment  in  equipment  located in  the 
2. While firms currently on the Ah4T are likely to have reduced incentives for domestic invest- 
ment, the overall effect of the AMT on domestic investment is more difficult to ascertain. This is 
because the AMT  also has an effect on firms that are currently paying regular tax but that anticipate 
a future period of AMT liability. These firms may have greater investment incentives currently 
than if they were to remain permanently on the regular tax. See Lyon (1990) for a discussion. The 
example discussed in the text considers incentives of firms currently subject to the AMT. 42  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
United States, the marginal effective corporate tax rate under the regular tax is 
26.8 per~ent.~  If  the firm is on the AMT for five years, the effective tax rate 
increases to 32.5 percent. For the same firm, if  the investment were located 
abroad and the income generated by the investment were subject to current U.S. 
taxation, the effective tax rate would decline from 38.3 percent under the regular 
tax to 36.8 percent under the AMT. This analysis suggests that the AMT creates 
a rehive  incentive to locate investment abroad rather than in the United StatesS4 
Domestic investment incentives on the AMT are reduced, while foreign invest- 
ment incentives are unchanged or improved under the AMT.5 
5.4  Income Repatriation Incentives 
The differences in statutory rates and foreign tax credit calculations create 
the potential for AMT firms to face different incentives for the receipt of 
foreign-source income than if they were subject to only the regular tax. Hines 
and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993), and Altshuler, Newlon, 
and Randolph (chapter 7 in this volume) have shown in other contexts that 
firms take advantage of deferral and timing opportunities to reduce their global 
tax liabilities on foreign-source income. 
A number of potential tax situations might be considered in evaluating the 
incentive for dividend repatriation and deferral. The variety of tax situations is 
somewhat larger under the AMT than for regular tax purposes, because the 
firm’s foreign tax credit position for regular tax purposes-that  is, whether it 
is in excess credit or excess limit-may  not be the same as its position under 
the AMT.  In addition, the firm may be in an excess credit position under the 
AMT due to either the separate income category limitations or the 90 percent 
3. The corporate marginal effective tax rate is calculated as (p -  s)/p,  where p is the cost of 
capital net of depreciation and s is the after-tax real return. The cost of capital for equipment is 
based on a capital-stock weighted average of the cost of capital for thirty-one types of equipment. 
Rates of depreciation are based on estimates by  Hulten and Wykoff  (1981). Annual inflation is 
assumed to be 3.8 percent, and the after-tax real rate of return is 5 percent. These and other as- 
sumptions follow Lyon 1990. 
4. Note that for both the regular tax and the AMT, foreign investment receives slower deprecia- 
tion allowances than  for domestic purposes, and, as a result, the effective tax rate for foreign 
investment is higher under either tax system than for domestic investment. Thus, it is not the case 
that the AMT creates an absolute incentive to invest abroad rather than domestically. Rather, the 
AMT creates an incentive relative to the regular tax system that favors foreign investment over 
domestic investment. 
5. Both foreign and domestic investment incentives may be reduced on the AMT when debt 
is used to finance investment. Finance costs are higher because interest payments are deductible 
at the corporate statutory tax rate (35 percent for a regular tax firm and 20 percent for an AMT 
firm). The after-tax cost of a dollar of interest payments thus rises from 65 cents to 80 cents on 
the AMT. (The loss in the value of the interest deductions under the AMT serves to increase the 
AMT credit a firm may claim in the future.) While the absolute cost of investment is increased on 
the AMT for debt-financed investment, the relative price of foreign investment to US.  investment 
is still lower for the AMT firm. 43  Alternative Minimum Tax Rules and Multinational Corporations 
limitation, discussed below, each of which may result in a different incentive 
for repatriation. 
AMT foreign tax credits differ from the foreign tax credits claimed by the 
taxpayer against regular income tax, although the process of calculating them 
is similar. Under both the regular tax and the AMT, the foreign tax credit that 
may be claimed in a given year is limited to the amount of U.S. tax that would 
have been paid on the foreign income. This limitation is calculated separately 
for each income category, or “basket.” 
The U.S. tax that would have been paid on the foreign income is calculated 
by multiplying (1) the ratio offoreign income to worldwide income by (2) the 
taxpayer’s  U.S.  tax liability (before use of foreign tax credits). Under the AMT, 
foreign income, worldwide income, and US.  tax liability used in this calcula- 
tion are all calculated using the AMT rules. The U.S. component of worldwide 
income will differ from that used in the regular tax computation, chiefly due 
to the various adjustments and preferences described above. Foreign income 
will  vary  to  a  lesser  extent,  because  the  depreciation  deductions  taken 
for foreign-use property under the regular tax rules are the same as under 
the AMT. 
After computing the foreign tax credits for each separate limitation category 
using AMT rules, a second, overall limitation is applied on the amount of for- 
eign tax credits that may be used against AMT. The combined use of deduc- 
tions for net operating losses and AMT foreign tax credits may  not reduce 
tentative minimum tax by  more than 90  percent. AMT foreign tax credits 
denied due to the 90 percent limitation are treated like other excess foreign tax 
credits, and may be carried back two years and carried forward five years to 
offset tentative minimum tax. 
The tax incentives for earnings repatriation are considered below for several 
foreign tax credit positions. 
5.4.1  Excess Limit Positions 
Consider a firm that is in an excess limit position for both the regular tax 
and the AMT. Under the regular tax, an additional dollar of earnings repatria- 
tions reduces regular tax liability by T* -  .35 (assuming the firm is subject to 
the 35 percent regular tax rate), where T* is the foreign tax rate. Earnings 
repatriated from  high-tax  countries  (T* > .35) thus  lower  current regular 
tax liability. For a firm on the AMT, tentative minimum tax is reduced by 
T* -  .20 from the additional earnings. 
The incentive for earnings repatriation is greater for a firm on the AMT. The 
reduction in current tax payments is 15 cents larger for the AMT firm than 
for a regular tax firm. The additional 15-cent saving today comes at a cost of a 
15-cent reduction in the AMT credit that could be claimed at a later date. The 
longer the delay before a firm would be able to use its AMT credits, the greater 
is the incentive to repatriate earnings while subject to the AMT. 44  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
5.4.2  Excess Credit Positions 
Under the regular tax, a firm in an excess credit position pays no additional 
U.S. tax upon the repatriation of  foreign income. The stock of  foreign tax 
credit carryovers is affected by repatriation, increasing by T* -  .35, where T* 
is the foreign tax rate per dollar of income. 
Similarly for AMT purposes, assuming the 90 percent limitation is not bind- 
ing, the additional dollar of  earnings repatriations results in no additional 
AMT, and the stock of  AMT foreign tax credits carried to another year in- 
creases by T* -  .20. In general, for firms in this position, incentives for repa- 
triation are the same for regular and AMT purposes. 
If  it is alternatively assumed that the 90 percent limitation on the use of 
foreign tax credits against tentative minimum tax is binding, the cost of repatri- 
ating foreign income while on the AMT is increased. This result can occur 
when the firm  has little domestic taxable income (due either to a small U.S. 
presence, loss carryforwards, or temporarily low domestic profits) and signifi- 
cant amounts of foreign income located in countries with tax rates above the 
AMT  statutory rate. An  additional dollar of  repatriated earnings increases 
AMT before credits by 20 cents. Only an additional 18 cents of AMT foreign 
tax credits may be used to offset this tax, so tentative minimum tax increases 
by 2 cents. Because current regular tax liability is unchanged by the receipt of 
this earnings, AMT increases by 2 cents, and a 2-cent AMT credit is generated. 
AMT foreign tax credits carried to another year increase by  T* -  .18. 
Relative to the case where the 90 percent limitation is not binding, there is 
a diminished incentive to repatriate earnings. This is true regardless of whether 
the marginal dividend is from a high-tax country or a low-tax country. 
5.4.3  Summary of Repatriation Incentives 
When one considers the possibility that the AMT foreign tax credit position 
of the firm may differ from the foreign tax credit position for regular tax pur- 
poses, six possible combinations of tax prices emerge. An analysis of all pos- 
sible tax price combinations suggests that, in general, the AMT offers firms 
the opportunity for low-cost earnings repatriations. In only one of the six cases 
is the AMT tax price greater than the regular tax price for all possible foreign 
tax rates. This case is where the firm faces the 90 percent limitation on foreign 
tax credits under the AMT, but for regular tax purposes is in an excess credit 
position. Even in this case, the firm faces only a 2-cent tax per dollar of repa- 
triated earnings. In four cases, the AMT tax price is less than the regular tax 
price for some foreign tax rates. In the remaining case, the tax prices are iden- 
tical. 
The next section presents data from tax returns on the extent of AMT liabil- 
ity among multinationals and seeks to examine whether foreign earnings repa- 
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5.5  Tax Return Data of Multinational Corporations 
Using Internal Revenue Service tax return information, it is possible to ex- 
amine the characteristics of multinational corporations paying AMT. Data on 
the receipt of foreign-source income by these multinationals are examined to 
explore the possibility that these firms alter their pattern of income repatriation 
to take advantage of  the timing opportunities made possible by  the firms’ 
AMT status. 
The data used in this analysis are from the 1990 Internal Revenue Service, 
Statistics of Income microdata files. These files contain data concerning gen- 
eral characteristics of firms, such as assets and tax liabilities, and data relating 
to foreign-source income and the credit position of firms with foreign tax cred- 
its. The data consist of  a stratified sample of  the corporate population.6 All 
corporations with more than $250 million in assets are included in the sample, 
while corporations in lower asset categories are sampled at a rate varying from 
50 percent to 0.25 percent. 
5.5.1 
Table 5.1 shows AMT incidence for all corporations and for firms claiming 
a foreign tax credit in 1990 (termed 11  18 filers, because such firms claim their 
foreign tax credits on form 11  18). While only 1 to 2 percent of all corporations 
incur AMT liability, a significantly higher percentage of  larger corporations 
pay AMT. Of corporations with assets in excess of $50 million, 24.6 percent 
of  corporations paid AMT. Among  1118 filers with assets in excess of  $50 
million, 28.1 percent paid AMT. AMT incidence is even more prevalent among 
the largespasset category, those with assets in excess of $500 million. Among 
all corporations in this largest asset category, 30.6 percent paid AMT. Of  11  18 
filers in this largest asset category, 33.3 percent paid AMT.7 
Counts of  corporations may understate the overall impact of  the AMT on 
economic activity. Because AMT incidence increases with asset size, a larger 
fraction of total assets is affected by the AMT than suggested by the number 
of firms paying AMT. Nearly 40 percent of all assets reported by corporations 
are owned by  firms paying AMT. Among 11  18 filers, AMT incidence is sig- 
nificantly greater when weighted by assets. Fifty-three percent of assets owned 
by  1118 filers are owned by those paying AMT. By coincidence, of all assets 
held by AMT payers, 53 percent of these assets are also owned by  11  18 filers 
paying AMT. 
AMT Status of Recipients of Foreign-Source Income 
6. Pass-through entities such as S-corporations, regulated investment companies, and real estate 
investment trusts are excluded from this analysis since they are not subject to the AMT. 
7. Note that even corporations paying only regular taxes can face the identical incentives as an 
AMT  payer to the extent that they are prevented from using AMT credits or other business credits 
to reduce regular tax liability below tentative AMT. It is hoped that these firms  can be separately 
identified in later work. Table 5.1  Counts of Corporations in 1990 by Size, AMT Status, and 1118 Status (in units) 
All Corporations  AMT Payers  AMT Incidence (%) 
All Corporations:  1 I18 Filers: 
Asset Size Class  11  18 Filers/  1 1  18 Filers/  AMT Payers/  AMT Payers/ 




































































































Source: Internal Revenue Service, corporate tax returns and  11 18 file, in  Statistics of Income, 1990. 47  Alternative Minimum Tax Rules and Multinational Corporations 
Another way of representing the importance of the AMT to multinationals 
is to examine the amount of  foreign-source income received by  1118 filers 
paying the AMT. In total, 56 percent of all foreign-source income is earned by 
AMT firms. As a result, incentives for the receipt of the majority of foreign- 
source income are governed by the rules and tax rates of the AMT rather than 
the regular tax. 
5.5.2  The Foreign Credit Position of AMT Taxpayers 
As described in section 5.4, the tax price of foreign-source income for AMT 
firms and the advantage of  dividend repatriation while subject to the AMT 
relative to the regular tax system depends on the foreign tax credit position 
both for regular tax purposes and for the AMT. As described earlier, six poten- 
tial tax price differentials exist for a firm subject to the AMT. In table 5.2, the 
foreign-source income of each 11  18 filer is classified into these six AMT cells 
(and two regular tax cells for non-AMT taxpayers), based on the foreign tax 
credit position of the firm. Analysis of these different cells gives some indica- 
tion of how repatriation incentives under the AMT may be affected relative to 
the regular tax. 
As mentioned above, 56 percent of  all foreign-source income accruing to 
corporations claiming a foreign tax credit accrues to AMT-paying firms. As 
shown in table 5.2, just under half of this amount (27 percent) is earned by 
firms that are in an excess credit position under both the regular tax and the 
AMT. Since these firms face the same tax price for the repatriation of foreign- 
source income on the AMT as they do on the regular tax, their dividend repatri- 
ations should not be directly affected by the AMT. 
Table  5.2  Foreign Tax  Credit Position of 1118 Filers in 1990 (foreign-source 
income in millions of $) 
Position for Regular Taxes 
Excess Limit 
No AMT liability  22,995 
26.01% 
Excess limit  4,225 
4.78% 
At 90% limit  2,657 
3.01% 
Excess credit  2,785 
3.15% 
Total  32,662 
Excess Credit  Total 
15,777  38,772 
17.85% 
536  4,761 
0.61% 
15,355  18,012 
17.37% 
24,073  26,858 
27.23% 
55,740  88,402 
Source: Internal Revenue Service,  corporate tax returns and 11  18 file, in Sraristics of  Income, 1990. 48  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
A complicating factor to this conclusion is that, as shown in section 5.3, 
AMT firms have slightly greater incentives to invest in real capital abroad than 
domestically, relative to the incentives under the regular tax. This could result 
in a reduced incentive to repatriate foreign-source income if funds are retained 
in the foreign location for reinvestment. Alternatively, there could be an in- 
creased incentive (relative to the regular tax) to repatriate funds from one for- 
eign location for use in a different foreign location. In this latter case, while 
measured repatriations would be increased, net repatriations, defined as repa- 
triations net of new transfers abroad, would be lower under the AMT. In future 
research, we wish to examine information on the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
parents to explore these latter hypotheses. 
The next largest cell for AMT taxpayers consists of firms facing the 90 per- 
cent limitation on the use of foreign tax credits for AMT purposes, but in an 
excess credit position for the regular tax. These firms pay  an extra tax of  2 
cents at the margin for each additional dollar of foreign-source income repatri- 
ated relative to their regular tax liability. Approximately 17 percent of foreign- 
source income is earned by firms facing this 2 percent marginal tax. While the 
2 percent tax applies at the margin, inframarginal amounts of foreign-source 
income may be fully sheltered by foreign tax credits, so total AMT payments 
are increased by  less than the maximum of  $307 million (0.02 times $15.35 
billion). 
Other cells in table 5.2 generate tax savings from repatriations relative to the 
tax that would be owed under the regular tax. For firms in excess limit under 
both the regular tax system and the AMT, each dollar of repatriations is subject 
to 15 cents less current tax than if the regular tax rules applied (.35 -  .20). 
Firnis in this cell save approximately $630 million in current taxes, which re- 
duce the AMT credit claimed at a future date by the same amount. Savings can 
also occur for AMT firms subject to the 90 percent limitation but in an excess 
limit position under the regular tax. Current U.S. tax payments are reduced to 
the extent that the average foreign tax rate is less than 33 percent (.35 -  .02). 
Finally, savings also accrue to firms in an excess credit position under the AMT 
but in excess limit for regular tax purposes. These firms reduce tax liabilities 
on their foreign source income under the AMT relative to their regular taxes 
by an amount proportional to the difference between the 35 percent regular tax 
rate and their average foreign tax credit rate (a number in excess of 20 percent) 
on each dollar of foreign-source income received. 
In sum, it appears that total payments of tax on foreign-source income are 
lower for the AMT firms than if they were subject to the regular tax rules. The 
analysis, however, has been unable to determine whether the increased incen- 
tive to receive foreign-source income actually significantly affects repatriation 
behavior. Future research designed to link the parent firm tax returns to infor- 
mation returns filed by the foreign subsidiaries will allow us to better examine 
how actual payout ratios are affected by the AMT. 49  Alternative Minimum Tax Rules and Multinational Corporations 
5.6  Conclusions 
This paper has shown the dimensions along which incentives of U.S.-based 
multinational corporations may be affected by the AMT. More than half of all 
corporate foreign-source income in 1990 was received by corporations subject 
to the AMT. As a result, the tax prices on foreign-source income created by 
the AMT may  be at least as important as those created by  the regular tax. 
While data shown in Gerardi, Milner, and Silverstein (1994) indicate that AMT 
incidence for the largest corporations in  1990 was approximately 25 percent 
greater than in 1989 or 1991, the large stock of unclaimed AMT credits accu- 
mulated by corporations suggests that the incentives created by the AMT will 
continue to be an important factor in the future. As shown in section 5.3, the 
AMT may  create a relative incentive for AMT firms to invest abroad rather 
than domestically. For firms interested in repatriating income from abroad, the 
AMT may  create a temporary timing opportunity that allows repatriation of 
this income at a lower cost than if the firms were subject to the rules of  the 
regular tax system. These two different incentives may  have an ambiguous 
overall effect on U.S. domestic investment if repatriated income is retained by 
the parent in the United States. Alternatively, the two incentives together may 
suggest that the AMT provides an opportunity for firms to repatriate income 
from foreign locations with poor reinvestment opportunities and reinvest the 
funds abroad in different foreign locations with better opportunities to take 
advantage of the temporary, relatively lower cost of capital. 
Future research will examine more closely the differences in repatriation 
behavior between AMT firms and non-AMT firms to determine whether the 
pattern of  repatriation from these subsidiaries is consistent with predictions 
based on differences in tax prices faced by these firms. 
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